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Abstract: 
 
Employing an optimizing framework, this paper shows that a target rule dominates a simple 
instrument rule when the focus of monetary policy is on CPI inflation. The target rule approach 
produces a systematic relationship between the current CPI inflation rate and the lagged policy 
instrument that renders the former immune to the stochastic risk premium. No matter how 
policy parameters are set, the optimal simple instrument rule cannot replicate the superior 
stabilization results achieved by the target rule approach. The optimal simple instrument rule 
also fails to account for the UIP puzzle. In contrast, the target rule approach can motivate the 
widely reported phenomenon whereby high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate. In fact 
the degree of openness and the central bank’s relative aversion to CPI inflation variability 
determine the sensitivity of observed changes in the nominal exchange rate to the lagged 
interest rate differential.  
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 There are two primary ways in which rule-based monetary policy can be specified 
in macroeconomic models. A central bank can follow a pre-specified rule which ties the 
setting of the policy instrument, typically a short-term interest rate, to the underlying 
target(s) of monetary policy. This mechanical rule compels the central bank to respond 
to the observed deviation of one or multiple target variables from its respective target 
value.  The speed with which the central bank counters observed deviations from target 
depends on the central bank’s willingness to tolerate target misses.  To the extent that 
the central bank adjusts the policy instrument gradually over time it must also decide 
on the size of the smoothing parameter attached to the lagged value of the policy 
instrument in this mechanical rule. Any policy parameters that appear in such a stand-
alone rule can be set with some discretion. In the literature a rule of this type is referred 
to as a simple instrument rule.  A clear and obvious advantage of a simple instrument 
rule is that its specification does not depend on any particular model or knowledge of 
the central bank’s objective function. A further advantage in the eyes of some is that the 
implementation of a simple instrument rule is not predicated on optimizing behavior by 
the central bank.  
The alternative approach to implementing monetary policy could not be more 
different.  The target rule approach is firmly grounded in an optimizing framework. The 
successful implementation of a target rule rests on full knowledge of the central bank’s 
objective function, i.e. the target variables proper, the associated target levels, and the 
weight attached to each target variable in the objective function. In addition, the target 
rule approach requires the specification of a model of the economy as one or more of its 
components represents the constraint the central bank faces in the execution of optimal 
monetary policy. The central bank minimizes the objective function subject to the 
constraint with respect to the target variables. The target rule is obtained by combining 
the optimizing conditions of the target variables. As such, the target rule is a clear, 
succinct, and arguably rigorous specification of optimal policy as it prescribes how the 
target variables are related to each other. An implicit reaction function can be backed 
out by substituting the components of the model into the target rule and solving for the 
policy instrument.  By following this reaction function mechanically, the central bank 
implements policy optimally. The coefficients on the variables and shocks that appear in 
the implicit reaction function depend on the weights attached to the target variables in 
the central bank’s loss function and the structural parameters of the model economy.  
This paper adds to the ongoing discussion about the merits of instrument versus 
target rules in the implementation of monetary policy. Svensson (1999, 2002, 2003, 
2005), Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2005) voice strong support for the target rule 
approach while McCallum (1999a,b) and McCallum and Nelson (2004, 2005) argue in 
favor of instrument rules. Comparing optimal instrument rules to target rules in both 
the aggregate demand-aggregate supply framework and the New Keynesian model, 
Froyen and Guender (2010) find that as long as the same information set underlies 
policymaking the two policy strategies produce the same optimal stabilization response. 
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The target rule approach does, however, have one distinct advantage over the optimal 
instrument rule which responds directly to all shocks of the model.1 If policy is 
conducted from a timeless perspective, the target rule approach can motivate the 
history-dependence and inertial character of monetary policy. While an optimal 
instrument rule can replicate the optimal stabilization response of policy from a 
timeless perspective, it cannot explain the inclusion of the lagged output gap in the 
instrument rule. A common thread running through all of these discussions is that they 
take place in a closed economy framework.  
This paper shifts the focus of the debate from a closed to a small open economy 
framework to address two questions pertinent to the conduct of monetary policy. The 
first question tackles the issue of the specification of optimal monetary policy rules in a 
small open economy where the central bank is concerned about the stability of the CPI 
inflation rate. Are there any obvious advantages or disadvantages associated with 
conducting optimal monetary policy by way of a simple instrument rule as opposed to a 
target rule? The second question addresses the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) 
puzzle. 2 Specifically, the paper asks whether the choice between a simple instrument 
and a target rule in a small open economy materially affects the linkage between the 
interest rate differential and changes in the nominal exchange rate. The focus of this 
part of the analysis rests squarely on whether there are obvious and acute differences 
between optimal simple instrument and target rules that have important implications 
for the behavior of nominal interest and exchange rates in open economies.   
There has been a long-standing interest in the second issue, the role of monetary 
policy as a key driver of the linkage between changes in the nominal exchange rate and 
the interest rate differential. McCallum (1994) recognizes that interest rate smoothing 
by the central bank can successfully explain the widely reported empirical failure of the 
UIP hypothesis.  In a simple rational expectations framework, the central bank, intent on 
countering pressure on the domestic currency to depreciate by raising the setting of the 
policy instrument, causes the emergence of an inverse relationship between observed 
changes in the nominal exchange rate and the lagged interest rate differential. 3 
                                                          
1
 Because of the requirement that the policymaker be in a position to observe and respond to all shocks of the 
model, optimal instrument rules are dismissed as being impracticable. Strictly speaking, the target rule 
approach suffers from the same problem as it relies on an implied reaction function that responds to all shocks 
of the model. 
2
 Absent any risk premium, the UIP hypothesis suggests that a positive interest rate differential (domestic 
interest rate – foreign interest rate) should be compensated in full by a depreciation of the domestic currency 
over the investment horizon. In practice, the presumed one-for-one relationship between the interest rate 
differential and the expected change in the nominal exchange rate is not apparent in the data. In fact, many 
studies report a negative association between movements in the interest rate differential and observed 
changes in the nominal exchange rate. The observed violation of the UIP condition has been labeled the “UIP 
Puzzle”. The “Carry Trade” phenomenon whereby high interest rate currencies are seen appreciating is 
symptomatic of the failure of the UIP condition. 
3
 To be precise, McCallum emphasizes the important distinction between UIP and tests of the unbiasedness 
hypothesis. What the literature generally regards as a failure of UIP is actually a failure of the unbiasedness 
hypothesis according to which the forward premium is not an accurate predictor of the change in the spot 
rate. 
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Employing an optimizing two-country framework standard in modern finance, Backus 
et al (2009) assume log-normal distribution of domestic inflation and introduce 
stochastic volatility into a simple instrument rule to show that uncovered interest rate 
parity need not hold. In their analysis, the inverse link between the interest rate 
differential and changes in the nominal exchange rate comes about if the domestic 
central bank ignores exchange rate movements in setting the policy instrument but the 
foreign central bank raises its policy instrument in response to its currency 
appreciating! In other words, seeing its currency gaining strength, the foreign country 
tightens monetary policy. This seems paradoxical.  
In both McCallum (1994) and Backus et al (2009) the central bank is viewed as 
following a simple instrument rule. The policy parameters are taken as given and 
assumed to satisfy basic criteria. Neither contribution concerns itself with the 
determination of optimal policy whereby the central bank minimizes an objective 
function to derive the values of the policy parameters. The current paper fills this gap. It 
embeds a simple instrument rule into a basic open-economy macro model and shows 
how an optimizing central bank determines the optimal policy parameters.  This lays 
the groundwork for conducting a comparison of the performance of optimal policy 
based on a simple instrument rule with optimal policy based on a target rule.  In a 
nutshell, this paper seeks to provide a fresh perspective on some of the issues involved 
in choosing between an instrument rule and a target rule in an expanded optimizing 
framework where the central bank is concerned about the variability of the policy 
instrument and the variability of CPI inflation. The central bank operates in an 
environment where the uncovered interest rate parity relationship is assumed to hold 
and inflation can be controlled by varying the policy instrument.  
The paper shows that the target rule has three distinct advantages over the optimal 
simple instrument rule. First, the target rule is a well-specified form of optimal policy 
while the simple optimal instrument rule suffers from a mathematical complexity that 
renders it inoperable.  Second, in contrast to the ad hoc simple instrument rule, the 
target rule approach provides a clear rationale for why the lag of policy instrument 
enters the model.  Third, the target rule approach can explain the UIP puzzle while the 
optimal simple instrument rule cannot.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the model. Section III 
compares and contrasts optimal policy based on an instrument versus a target rule. This 
section also looks at the implications for the test of the UIP hypothesis of basing the 
conduct of optimal policy on an instrument as opposed to a target rule. Section IV 
concludes.  
 
II. The Model  
This section lays out the model that serves as the frame of reference for examining 
the merits of simple instrument and target rules in a small open economy. The model 
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consists of five equations. Variables marked by an asterisk denote the foreign 
counterpart of the domestic variable.  Foreign variables are treated as exogenous 
random variables. The first equation is the definition of the policy instrument (xt).The 
policy instrument is defined as the difference between the domestic interest rate (it ) 
and the foreign interest rate (  
 ) .  Adopting this convention simplifies the analysis and 
allows us to compare our results directly with those reported by McCallum (1994). The 
second equation is the UIP condition in nominal terms. It allows for the existence of a 
risk premium (   . The two remaining equations describe the behavior of inflation. 
Equation (3) is a condensed equation of the rate of domestic inflation. It is obtained by 
combining three different elements: an open economy IS equation, UIP in real terms, 
and a Phillips Curve. 4  The rate of domestic inflation is inversely related to the policy 
instrument but reacts positively to the difference between expected domestic inflation 
and expected inflation abroad in period t+1. The composite stochastic disturbance 
captures the effect of demand-side and cost-push shocks on domestic inflation. Equation 
(4) is the definition of CPI inflation. 
 
        
         (1) 
                     (2) 
                       
         (3) 
              
        
                  
                 
  
                    
        (4) 
       
 
III.  Instrument vs. Target Rules 
1. A Simple Instrument Rule to Target the CPI Inflation Rate 
McCallum (1994) investigates the nexus between the instrument rule that the 
central bank follows to implement monetary policy and the behavior of the nominal 
exchange rate. He proposes the following instrument rule: 
                                                          
4
Equation (3) is based on a simple Phillips Curve, i.e. one without forward-looking inflationary expectations. 
Likewise, the expected output gap next period has been dropped from the IS relation.  This simplification is not 
crucial to the results reported. Forward-looking expectations of the rate of domestic inflation do appear in 
equation (3), however, because in the IS relation the output gap depends inversely on the expected real rate 
of interest. The additive disturbance is a composite term consisting of random disturbances and exogenous 
variables that appear in the IS relation, the UIP relation, and the Phillips curve. For further details on the 
specification of the Phillips curve, IS relation and the UIP condition, the reader is referred to part D of the 
appendix. 
6 
 
                      (5) 
 
His simple instrument rule has two key features.  The central bank adjusts the 
setting of the instrument if the change in the nominal exchange rate deviates from its 
fixed target value (which for simplicity is assumed to be zero). The central bank also 
adjusts the policy setting gradually over time. Thus, the current setting of the policy 
instrument depends on the setting in the previous period. Both    and    are policy 
parameters that the central bank controls. McCallum combines the instrument rule 
(eq.(5)) with the UIP condition (eq. (2) )to show that interest rate smoothing by a 
central bank, i.e.        leads to a negative coefficient on the lagged interest rate 
differential in the reduced form equation for the change in the nominal exchange rate. 
To be precise, the coefficient on the lagged interest rate differential in said equation 
equals (minus) the ratio of the policy parameters, i.e. 
  
  
.  One would expect both 
policy parameters to be positive as central banks typically smooth interest rates and 
“lean against the wind”, i.e. attempt to stem a depreciating domestic currency by raising 
the short-term interest rate.  
McCallum’s theoretical example provides a plausible explanation for why empirical 
tests of the UIP hypothesis typically reject its validity. The standard test of the joint 
hypothesis of UIP and rational expectations consists of a regression of the change in the 
nominal exchange rate on the lagged interest rate differential. Employing this test 
regression, scores of empirical papers report either statistically insignificant or 
statistically significant negative coefficients on the interest rate differential for a large 
number of countries over different sample periods.5 
But is the exchange rate really the focus of monetary policy in the small open 
economies of the developed world? McCallum’s specification of the policy target in the 
instrument rule is arguably at odds with conventional practice. In most industrialized 
countries, central banks have a target for the CPI inflation rate. They are less worried 
about changes in the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, the nominal exchange rate needs to 
be flexible as it acts as a shock absorber under CPI inflation targeting. If the central bank 
engages in interest smoothing and is intent on keeping the CPI inflation rate in check, 
then the instrument rule takes the following form: 
         
        
 
         (6) 
Here     
 
represents the fixed target for the CPI inflation rate.  In the remainder of the 
paper we assume this fixed target value to be zero.  Positive values for the two policy 
parameters seem plausible.  
                                                          
5
 See, for instance, Fama (1984), Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis (1995), Engel (1996), Chinn and Meredith 
(2004), Burnside et al (2008). 
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This instrument rule can be combined with equations (2) –(4) of the model to  
produce the reduced form solutions for the policy instrument and the endogenous 
variables of the model:6 
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Several observations about the above solutions are noteworthy. First, according to 
equation (7), the policy instrument responds only to the risk premium and does not 
depend on its own lag even though the central bank engages in interest smoothing.  At 
first sight this may strike the reader as a surprising result. However, it can be explained 
by scrutinizing the behavior of the CPI inflation rate under the instrument rule. 
Substitute equation (9) into the instrument rule (eq. (6)) and notice that the lags of the 
policy instrument cancel so that the current instrument setting responds only to the risk 
premium.   
Second, notice that the rate of CPI inflation responds only to the risk premium apart 
from the lagged interest rate differential. With the rate of CPI inflation being immune to 
the other shocks of the model, it is left to the two components of the CPI inflation rate – 
the rate of domestic inflation and particularly the nominal exchange rate to act as shock 
absorbers. Inspection of equations (8) and (10) reveals that the rate of domestic 
inflation and the exchange rate react to the cost-push shock (      the IS shock (  ), and 
the foreign interest rate (  
 ) so that the CPI inflation rate is not affected. Again, this can 
be easily verified by substituting equations (8) and (10) into the definition of the CPI 
                                                          
6
 For simplicity, we assume that all shocks are white noise with a constant variance. The first step of the 
solution procedure involves setting up putative solutions for those variables whose forward-looking 
expectations appear in the model. They are: the change in the nominal exchange rate and the domestic rate of 
inflation. The lagged policy instrument appears in both putative solutions. Following the procedure suggested 
by McCallum (1994), we solve equation (2) for the policy instrument after substituting for the expected change 
in the exchange rate. This equation is then substituted into the instrument rule (eq. (6)) where the CPI inflation 
rate has been replaced with equation (4). The resulting expression is finally combined with equation (3) to 
yield the solution for    . Given the solution for    , we can proceed to solve for the remaining endogenous 
variables and the policy instrument. The appendix provides further details on the solution procedure.  
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inflation rate, equation (4).  It is worth noting that the (change in the) exchange rate 
responds to all shocks of the model and is therefore expected to be rather volatile under 
CPI inflation targeting.  
Third, consider the coefficient on the lagged interest rate differential in equation 
(10), the reduced form equation for the change in the nominal exchange rate.  If 
monetary policy focuses on a CPI inflation target, then this coefficient depends not only 
on the two policy parameters in the instrument rule,           , as in McCallum’s set- 
up, but also on the weight      of the foreign consumption good in the CPI. This weight is 
often interpreted as measuring the degree of openness of the economy. The degree of 
openness matters now as the focus of monetary policy in the instrument rule is not on 
the change in the nominal exchange rate but on the CPI inflation rate.  And the degree of 
openness determines the extent to which the CPI inflation rate changes in response to a 
change in the nominal exchange rate.  
Fourth, consider the solutions for the policy instrument and the CPI inflation rate, 
the two variables that appear in the instrument rule.  The coefficient on the risk 
premium in both solutions depends only on the two policy parameters     and    and 
the degree of openness   but not on  . The parameter                 is a 
summary measure of the potency of the interest and exchange rate channels on 
aggregate demand and its flow-on effect on domestic inflation. Thus, the behavior of the 
CPI inflation rate and the policy instrument is completely insensitive to key features of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism through which changes in policy affect 
the ultimate targets of monetary policy.    
 
2.  Monetary Policy Based on a Optimal Simple Instrument Rule 
In the previous section, we specified a simple instrument rule without giving a 
detailed account of how the central bank determines the values of the policy parameters 
   and   . In this section we examine how an optimizing central bank chooses the values 
of both policy parameters. An analysis of optimizing behavior on the part of the central 
bank necessitates the specification of the central bank’s objective function. It is 
customary to assume that central banks wish to minimize fluctuations in CPI inflation 
and the output gap. In addition, they wish to avoid huge swings in the setting of the 
policy instrument for fear of unsettling financial markets. We simplify matters by 
specifying an objective function for a central bank which is concerned only about the 
variability of the CPI inflation rate and the policy instrument, respectively. The policy 
problem for the central bank then becomes:7 
                          
         (11) 
                                                          
7
 The target for the policy instrument and the rate of CPI inflation, respectively, is usually constant. 
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The central bank chooses the two policy parameters    and    to minimize the 
variances of the policy instrument and the CPI inflation rate. The parameter   measures 
the central bank’s aversion to CPI inflation variability relative to instrument variability.  
The optimal values for the two policy parameters are: 
  
   
  
       
       
  
   
       
 
 
      and    (12) 
  
  
  
       
        
   
   
       
  
 
These solutions are problematic. The existence of two pairs of solutions for the 
optimal policy parameters is far less disconcerting than the fact that all four roots are 
complex numbers. With     and      , the term in the square root in the 
denominator of all four solutions is negative. From a practical point of view, optimal 
instrument rules such as equation (6) are clearly inoperative. From a theoretical 
perspective, the optimal instrument rule is inconsistent with a well-defined rational 
expectations equilibrium as the characteristic equation of the relevant coefficient matrix 
does not produce two roots outside the unit circle.8 
 Irrespective of the solution pair chosen, the linear combination of   
     
   adds up 
to zero. This linear combination appears in the denominator of the coefficient on the 
risk premium in the solutions of both inflation rates, the change in the nominal 
exchange rate, and the policy instrument. The variances of the policy instrument and 
the CPI inflation rate – both of which appear in the objective function - would literally 
explode! As would the variances of the other two variables, the domestic rate of 
inflation and the exchange rate. A third characteristic of the solutions is that the ratio of 
the two optimal policy parameters equals 
  
 
  
      Substituting this result into the 
coefficient on the lagged interest rate differential  in equation (10) reduces the 
coefficient to 1. But this suggests that the optimal instrument rule, which assumes 
interest rate smoothing, cannot explain the systematic failure of standard tests of UIP 
which rely on regressing the first difference of the nominal exchange rate on the lagged 
interest rate. 
Taken altogether, the following conclusion emerges. If the model economy and the 
policymaker’s objective function, described in Section 1, capture the essence of their 
                                                          
8
 This conclusion follows from applying the procedure outlined by Woodford (2003) in the addendum to 
chapter 4. Part E of the appendix of the current paper provides further details.   
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real world counterparts, it is not advisable to base the conduct of monetary policy on an 
instrument rule that seeks to respond optimally to deviations of the CPI inflation rate 
from target and chooses the optimal degree of persistence. Implementing monetary 
policy in this fashion leads to unstable behavior of the policy instrument, the CPI 
inflation rate, the domestic inflation rate, and the nominal exchange rate. 
3. Optimal Policy Based on a Target Rule 
 
The cornerstone of the target rule approach to formulate monetary policy is the 
policymaker’s objective function. The objective function of the central bank was 
introduced in the previous section and consists of the variance of the policy instrument 
and the variance of CPI inflation: 
            
     (13) 
  
Associated with the quadratic objective function is a linear target rule. This rule 
embodies a systematic relationship between the variables that appear in the objective 
function. The specific form that the target rule takes depends in part on the way 
monetary policy is implemented. For the case at hand, the linear target rule is a 
simplified version of the one that underlies policy from a timeless perspective. 
Employing this simple target rule has two important advantages. First, it permits the 
derivation of closed form solutions of the endogenous variables of the model and, 
second, it identifies the key parameters in the UIP puzzle. 
A noteworthy feature of the rule proposed below is that the same three variables 
appear in it as in the simple instrument rule. As such the target rule looks deceptively 
similar to the instrument rule of the previous section. However, there is a fundamental 
difference between the two policy rules concerning the interpretation of the policy 
parameters. 
               
      (14) 
  and    are relative weights that the central bank treats as policy parameters. They 
represent the importance that the central bank attaches in the target rule to the policy 
instrument in the current and previous period, respectively, compared to the current 
rate of CPI inflation.9  
The policymaker’s objective is to minimize the expected loss function by choosing 
the optimal values of   and     
         
                 
     (15) 
                                                          
9
 The appendix shows how the target rule is determined from an intertemporal perspective. The appendix 
shows further that the proposed target rule achieves almost the same stabilization results as the target rule 
underlying policy from a timeless perspective. 
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To solve the model for the endogenous variables, substitute first the definition of the 
CPI inflation rate, equation (4), into the target rule. Next, eliminate the current-period 
rate of domestic inflation by substituting equation (3) into the target rule. The policy 
instrument can be eliminated by the amended UIP condition where the expected change 
in the exchange rate next period has been disposed of with the help of the putative 
solution for the exchange rate. Finally, solve for the change in the nominal exchange 
rate.  Once we have the solution for the change in the nominal exchange rate, we can 
solve for the remaining endogenous variables of the model. The solutions appear in 
equations (16) – (19). 
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           (19) 
 
Substituting the variances of the CPI inflation rate and the policy instrument into the 
objective function and minimizing with respect to the two policy parameters yields 
their respective optimal value: 
  
              
 =
 
  
         (20) 
These optimal settings give rise to a few interesting observations. First, the target 
rule 14) and equation (18) reduce to  
     
     
 
  
          (21) 
Under a target rule, there is no contemporaneous relationship between the CPI rate 
of inflation and the policy instrument; the rate of CPI inflation is pre-determined. The 
current rate of CPI inflation depends only on the setting of the policy instrument in the 
previous period and does not respond to the current risk premium. With the CPI 
inflation rate being immune to the shock of the UIP relation, it follows that the change in 
the nominal exchange rate and the rate of domestic inflation share the burden of 
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adjusting to the risk premium optimally.10 After substituting the optimal policy 
parameters into equations (17), (18), and (19), one finds that the response of the policy 
instrument, the rate of domestic inflation, and the change in the nominal exchange rate 
to the risk premium is well-defined.  As such the target rule avoids introducing the 
serious complexity into policymaking that occurs under the instrument rule.  
Second, just like under the simple instrument rule approach, the optimal responses 
of the rate of CPI inflation and the policy instrument depend on the degree of openness 
and the preference parameter in the objective function but not on the parameter  . 
Third, there is indeed an inverse relationship between changes in the nominal exchange 
rate and the lagged policy instrument under optimal policy that is based on a target rule. 
The coefficient on     in equation (19) equals 
 
   
. The sensitivity of changes in the 
nominal exchange rate to the lagged policy instrument depends on the central bank’s 
relative aversion to CPI inflation variability and the degree of openness. The greater this 
aversion, the weaker the negative association between the lagged interest rate 
differential and the change in the nominal exchange rate.  In countries where CPI 
inflation targeting is the norm, standard regression-based tests of the UIP hypothesis 
should find no evidence for its validity.  
 
4. A Comparison of the Two Approaches 
The findings yielded by the target rule approach afford the opportunity to explore 
the connection between the optimal policy parameters of the instrument rule approach 
(     ) and the two parameters that help define the target rule approach,   and    The 
information presented in Table 1 is key to understanding the fundamental difference 
between the instrument rule and the target rule approach in the simple open economy 
framework of this paper.  Attention focuses on the optimal response of            and 
  
    to the lagged interest rate differential and the risk premium. For the remaining 
disturbances the instrument and target rule produce identical optimal responses.  
Table 1A shows the response of the current policy instrument and domestic 
inflation, the two variables that do not depend on past information, to the risk premium 
under both policy rules. A simple comparison of the two coefficients on the risk 
premium in the solution for    reveals that choosing the ratio 
  
  
=   generates identical 
responses under both implementation schemes. Substituting the same ratio into the 
coefficient on    in the solution for    under the instrument rule approach also yields 
the same optimal response as under the target rule. The instrument rule approach can 
hypothetically deliver a well-defined and optimal response of the policy instrument and 
the domestic rate of inflation to the risk premium if the ratio of the optimal policy 
                                                          
10 To see this, multiply the solution for the domestic inflation rate (eq.17) and the change in the nominal exchange rate 
(eq.19) by       and  , respectively, and add the two components. 
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parameters equals the weight on squared CPI inflation rate deviations in the objective 
function multiplied by the degree of openness. The obvious problem with the 
instrument rule is, however, that its implementation rests on choosing the optimal 
settings for    and    separately. Determining the optimal weights in this fashion results 
in a different ratio of the two optimal policy parameters as shown in sub-section 2:  
  
 
  
   
 
 
    
This is not the only drawback associated with the instrument rule.  A further 
complication that besets the instrument rule approach is that it cannot deliver the 
optimal response of the CPI inflation rate and the change in the exchange rate to the risk 
premium generated by the target rule. The problem with the instrument rule arises 
because the central bank is not free to choose the optimal policy parameters 
independently of each other. For argument’s sake, suppose that the central bank 
implements policy by the instrument rule and chooses  
  
  
   .  
Consider the entries in Table 1B which describes the behavior of the CPI inflation 
rate and the change in the exchange rate. Picking this particular ratio for the policy 
parameters in the instrument rule evokes the same response to      in both   
    and 
    as under the target rule.  Thus the instrument rule can match the optimal response 
to the lagged policy instrument produced by the target rule.  
Consider next the response of the CPI inflation rate to the risk premium under the 
target rule and the instrument rule, respectively. Both coefficients appear in the top-half 
of Table 1B. The CPI inflation rate is immune to the risk premium under the target rule 
approach but not under the instrument rule approach. For the latter, the numerator and 
denominator of the coefficient on the risk premium have been divided by     Observe 
that the numerator of the coefficient can approach zero only if    tends towards infinity. 
But letting    take on this extreme value forces   towards zero for a fixed value of   if 
  
  
    is to be maintained. Alternatively, letting    take on extreme values would 
require    to do so, too, which makes the instrument rule inoperable. A similar 
argument applies to the response of the exchange rate change to the risk premium. The 
bottom row of Table 1B shows that the instrument rule coefficient differs from the 
target rule coefficient by 
 
  
. To make the two response coefficients equal requires 
    . But this would require      which in turn leaves the ratio of the two policy 
parameters undefined. However one looks at the issue, the fact remains that the 
hypothetical instrument rule cannot deliver the optimal response of the CPI inflation 
and the change in the exchange rate to the risk premium while the target rule approach 
can.  
At a more general level, there is an information asymmetry that results in different 
outcomes under the two approaches. The superior performance of the target rule 
derives from its ability to respond optimally to all shocks of the model. Underlying the 
target rule approach is an implied reaction function that delivers this optimal response. 
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The implied reaction function can be obtained by substituting into the target rule, first, 
the definition of the CPI inflation rate and, second, the equation describing the behavior 
of domestic inflation. Solving this equation for the policy instrument xt shows that the 
policymaker at time t observes the composite shock (  ).  
    
 
      
                              
               
     
           (22) 
While the composite shock, which includes     is in the policymaker’s information set at 
time t under a target rule it is not under an instrument rule. When implementing the 
latter, the policymaker responds only to a deviation of the target variable from its fixed 
target but not directly to the shock that causes the deviation.11  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Recent discussions of the merits of instrument and target rules in the conduct of 
monetary policy focus on the closed economy New Keynesian framework.  The current 
paper shifts the debate to an open economy framework. Employing a basic optimizing 
framework, this paper shows that a target rule dominates a simple instrument rule 
when the CPI inflation rate is the focus of monetary policy in a small open economy.  
The target rule approach produces a systematic relationship between the current 
rate of CPI inflation and the lagged policy instrument. The weight the central bank 
places on the CPI inflation rate in the target is the product of two parameters: the 
relative aversion to inflation variability in its objective function and the degree of 
openness of the economy. The dominance of the target rule approach manifests itself in 
its ability to shield CPI inflation from a risk premium shock.  This shock affects only the 
two endogenous components of the CPI inflation rate, domestic inflation and the change 
in the nominal exchange rate.  
Specifying monetary policy in terms of a simple instrument rule suffers from the 
drawback that it is impossible for the central bank to choose the two optimal policy 
parameters independently of each other. No matter how policy parameters are set, the 
optimal simple instrument rule cannot replicate the superior stabilization results 
achieved by the target rule approach.  
The optimal simple instrument rule also fails to account for the UIP puzzle in the 
simple optimizing framework of this paper. In contrast, the target rule approach can 
explain the widely reported empirical phenomenon whereby high interest rate 
currencies tend to appreciate. In fact the degree of openness of the economy and the 
central bank’s relative aversion to CPI inflation variability – the same parameters that 
                                                          
11
 We make this point to highlight the information asymmetry between the two policy rules. As shown in the 
paper, ultimately the policy instrument does not respond to the composite shock as its direct effect is 
cancelled by the indirect effect which works through the change in the nominal exchange rate. This property is 
due to the simplicity of our model framework. See Froyen and Guender (2007, 2010) for a more elaborate 
discussion of instrument versus target rules in the conduct of optimal monetary policy.  
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appear in the target rule - determine the sensitivity of observed changes in the nominal 
exchange rate to the lagged interest rate differential. 
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Table 1A: The Response of the Policy Instrument and Domestic Inflation to the Risk                     
Premium. 
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Table 1B: The Response of CPI inflation and the Change in the Exchange Rate to the 
Lagged Policy Instrument and the Risk Premium. 
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Appendix:  A. The Intertemporal Optimization Problem  
The starting point of discussing optimizing behavior from an intertemporal 
perspective is the policymaker’s objective function. The policymaker seeks to minimize 
an intertemporal loss function that consists of squared deviations of the CPI inflation 
rate and the policy instrument. The constraint the policymaker faces is based on the 
condensed equation that describes the behavior of the domestic rate of inflation. After 
manipulating equation (1.3), we can express it in terms of the CPI inflation rate and the 
policy instrument.12 The policy problem that the central bank faces can then be stated 
as: 
    
  
       
      
      
       
    
 
   
  (23) 
subject to 
   
            
               
          
                (24) 
The policymaker implements monetary policy from a timeless perspective, a form of 
optimal policy under commitment. The key characteristic of this type of optimal policy 
is that the policymaker can successfully manipulate the forward-looking expectations 
formed by agents. Another important characteristic is that the policymaker ignores the 
initial period when choosing the rate of CPI inflation and the policy instrument.  In 
setting up the constraint that appears in the Lagrangean, we replace future changes in 
the nominal exchange rate by the policy instrument minus the risk premium. After all, it 
is assumed that UIP holds in the model.  
The Lagrangean takes the following form: 
       
     
            
            
             
                  
      
       
       
                
              
               
                        
       
        
       
                
                  
               
                        
      
    
    is predetermined as it depends on the stetting of the policy instrument in the 
previous period (plus      and an expectational error). 
Suppose in time period t the policymaker sets policy for period t+j, j=0,1,2,3, ……. . 
The optimizing condition for the rate of CPI inflation in period t is: 
            
          (25) 
The optimizing condition for the policy instrument in the same period is: 
                                                          
12
 The derivation of the constraint appears in part D of the appendix.  
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                    (26) 
     denotes the Lagrange Multiplier in period t+j. Here it becomes apparent that the 
derivation of the target rule in the current context is somewhat more complex than in 
the canonical New Keynesian model. The added complexity is due to the presence of 
     in equation (26). 13 To derive the optimal target rule, we begin by solving equation 
(25) for     and equation (26) for       
 
  
 
 
 
       
 
 
   
    
    
 
(27) 
         
  
       
 
   
     (28) 
After lagging equation (28) by one period, we set the two equations equal to each 
other. Doing so yields the optimal target rule expressed solely in terms of the target 
variable and the policy instrument. 
     
 
   
    
      
  
       
 
   
       (29) 
The optimal target rule relates the weighted sum of current and lagged rates of CPI 
inflation to the weighted sum of lagged rates of the policy instrument. There is no place 
for   in the optimal target rule. A parsimonious representation of the optimal target 
rule is obtained by restricting the number of lags to one on both sides of equation (29) 
and setting      In this case, the target rule reduces to a simple expression that links 
the current rate of CPI inflation to the lagged policy instrument: 
        
       
 
  
                    (30)
  
Greater emphasis on stability in the rate of CPI inflation and greater openness weaken 
the link between current CPI inflation and the lagged policy instrument. Equation (30) is 
the same target rule that appears in Section III.3 which discusses the implementation of 
monetary policy via the target rule approach from a more heuristic angle.  There we 
employ an expected loss function that consists of a weighted combination of the 
unconditional variances of the CPI inflation rate and the policy instrument. Equation 
                                                          
13
 Strictly speaking, the expectation of      should appear in eq. (26). 
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(13) results if, first, one multiplies the intertemporal loss function by (1-   and, second, 
takes the limit as      
It can easily be verified that basing policy on the proposed simplified target rule 
generates results that approximate the globally optimal rule.  
DYNARE, a numerical optimization procedure, can be used to determine the 
variances of the endogenous variables and the policy instrument under the globally 
optimal rule, i.e. under policy from a timeless perspective. For       ,           
             , and unit variances for all exogenous disturbances, the variances of 
the relevant variables are shown in Table A1.14 
Table A1: Results Based on Policy from a Timeless Perspective  
V(x) V(      V(    E(L)=V(x)+         V(  ) V(  ) 
0.0191 0.1187 4.0216 0.1378 0.0763 0.4770 
 
There are two Lagrange Multipliers in this set-up because DYNARE solves the model by 
imposing two constraints: the UIP condition and equation (24). 
Table A2 shows the variances of the policy instrument, the CPI inflation rate and the 
change in the nominal exchange rate under simple commitment where the proposed 
target rule (equation (30)) governs the relationship among the target variables.  All 
variances are based on the analytical results reported in Section III of the paper. It is 
apparent that these variances are very close to those reported in Table A1.  
Table A2: Results Based on Simplified Target Rule 
   
 
 
B. A Proposed Solution Method: The Case of the Instrument Rule   
For the change in the nominal exchange rate we pose the following putative solution: 
                  
              (31) 
For the domestic rate of inflation we pose a similar trial solution: 
    
                                                        
                (32) 
                                                          
14
 The entries reported in Table A1 were calculated with the help of DYNARE. 
V(x) V(      V(    E(L)=V(x)+         
0.0190 0.1189 4.0213 0.1379 
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As all shocks of the model are assumed to be white noise processes, the forward-looking 
expectations are given by: 
                                   (33)  
                    (34) 
With the help of equation (33), we can solve the UIP equation for xt.  
      
 
     
        (35) 
Combine (35) with the instrument rule and definition of CPI inflation rate: 
 
     
      (1-             
             (36) 
Next, substitute the domestic inflation equation (3) into (36). Replace the policy 
instrument by equation (35). Doing so results in an equation that describes the behavior 
of the change in the nominal exchange rate:  
        
 
     
 
  
     
                               
             
(37) 
Next substitute the trial solution for the change in the nominal exchange rate into 
equation (37). Matching coefficients on both sides of the equation yields the following 
solutions for the coefficients in the trial solution: 
     
  
   
                       = 
   
 
     (38) 
     
 
      
                     
The solution for     can be substituted back into equation (36) and solved for the 
rate of domestic inflation.  
            
  
      
          (39) 
Replacing the rate of domestic inflation on the left-hand side with the trial solution 
(32) and matching coefficients result in the following solutions: 
   
             
                                   
    
      
     (40) 
 
To reconcile these results with those reported in the main part of the paper, replace 
the shock in the domestic inflation equation with        -    
                . 
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C. Derivation of Budget Constraint 
Multiply the domestic inflation equation by        
                                  
         (41) 
Add and subtract         
  on the left-hand side of above equation and restate 
resulting expression as: 
  
   =        
                                 
                   
   
                                 (42) 
Making use of the definition of the CPI inflation rate and the UIP condition on the right-
hand side allows us to express equation (42) as 
  
   =         
          
                  
                 (43) 
or  
  
            
               
          
                                 (43’) 
This is the constraint of the policymaker in the intertemporal optimization problem. 
 
D. Derivation of Domestic Inflation Equation 
We begin with the standard specification of the Phillips Curve and an open-economy 
IS relation: 
1t t t t tE y u             (44) 
 1 1 1 2 1( )CPIt t t t t t t t t ty E y a i E a q E q v            (45) 
     real exchange rate. 
Assume perfect exchange rate pass-through. This allows us to replace the CPI 
inflation rated with 
   
           .       (46) 
The IS relation can then be restated as: 
 1 1 1 2 1 1( ) )t t t t t t t t ty E y a i E a a E q v              (47) 
Next, we impose real UIP to eliminate         from the equation. 
   1 1 1 2 1 1 1* *( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t t t t ty E y a i E a a i i E E v                  (48) 
Add and subtract * *1 1( )t t ta i E  : 
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1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
* * * *
* *
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
y E y a i i a E E a a i i a a E E
v a i E
      

    

           
    
             (49) 
Making use of the definition of the policy instrument allows us to rewrite the above 
as: 
    * * *1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )                     t t t t t t t t t t t t ty E y a a x a a E E v a i E a a
 (50) 
 
Substitute this equation into the Phillips Curve: 
    1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1
2 1 1 1
1 1 *
* *
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t
E y a a x a a E E
E w
v a a a i E
   
   
  
  


       
   
       (51)
 
Simplify by dropping the         and         terms. 
1 1 1 1 2 1
* * *( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t t tx E E v a i E a a w                           (52)
 
The presence of the forward-looking expectation of inflation in this equation implies that 
monetary policy works partly through the expectations channel. Expected future inflation 
affects current inflation because the formation of this expectation is influenced by the 
interest rate differential. The lagged interest rate differential enters the model either 
through the instrument rule or the target rule. 
The above equation can be simplified to read 
1 1
*
t t t t t t tx E E u                  (53)
 
where 
1 1 2 1
* *( ( ) )t t t t t t tu v a i E a a w            
1 2
1[ ( ) ]a a     . 
 
E. Determinacy of Equilibrium Under a Simple Instrument Rule 
The model is written in terms of the forward-looking expectation of the rate of inflation 
and the nominal exchange rate, respectively, and the policy instrument.  
         
 
 
                   
               
 
 
   (54) 
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                  (55) 
   
                   
               (56) 
   
Now define      
  
   
    
  and       = 
      
       
  
 . Then the above three equations can be 
rewritten as                where    is a vector of the disturbances and A and B are 
coefficient matrices. The characteristic equation of the matrix A has three roots.  
    
           
 
   
        
 
 =0       (57) 
    
           
 
 
   
        
 
 
The rational expectations equilibrium is well-defined if two roots lie outside the unit circle 
and one within.  
The three roots of the characteristic equation are:  
     
     
                                      
  
 
 
According to (12) in the text, the optimal policy parameters satisfy the linear restriction 
   
    
     
Imposing this condition on the second and third root produces another zero root: 
  
     
   
           
 
 
Hence the condition that two roots lie outside the unit circle is violated. A simple optimal 
instrument rule fails to establish a well-defined rational expectations equilibrium. 
Analogously, one can check whether various conditions that apply to    and    are met. 
(For further details, see page 673 in Woodford (2003)). Here we consider condition C.15 as 
specified by Woodford.  
According to C15:    
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This condition is violated, however, as    
    
   . 
